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I :'i Tfll SUPJ(lcJI COURT OF THE ST,Hl JF UT:HI 
---oooOooo---
I'.RIGIJT llE\LLOI'r-!l:NT, rr;c. 
a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
:l.ppellan t 
TilL CITY OF WELLSVILLE, 
a municipal corporation, 
llefenuant and 
Respondent. 
---oooOooo---
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16531 
This is an action by appellant seeking a Writ of Man-
dantus requiring respondent to approve a final subdivision 
11lat of appellant and further seeking Jeclaratory relief re-
l:1ting to the requirements of respondent's ordinances and 
the requirements of state la1\. 
LJISPOSITIO~ IN THE LOWER COURT 
~t the conclusion of appellant's presentation of its 
Lase during a heJring held March 2, 1979, respondent moved 
fr1r the ,lisntissal of the same. The Trial Court took said 
:~:ot ron under auvisement and requested the submission of 
- l -
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of ~lemoranda of L:r1v by the partie:;. f.Jcrnoranda v,c rL' f Jlvd hi th 
and reviewed bv the 1rial Court. T h c 'l r i ~rl Court t b c r cup on 
granted respondent's Glotion to llrc;miss, dcnicd a)!pellant's 
request for \','ri t ,J[ ~l:rndarnus ~rnd found that rcc;pondcnt h;1d 
in effect at J.ll times pertinent to thi :-; action val idly enacted 
Subdivision and Water Ordinances which effectively responded to 
appellant's request for Declaratory Relief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON .'\!'PEAL 
Respondent n:spectfully requests that this Court ~rffirr11 
in its entirety the dec1sion of the Trial Court and in addi-
tion, a\,·;nc.l the resJ"-'n.', ·;t r t~ costs incurred in the defense 
of this o.ppeal. 
STAlfi.IENT 01- i'ACTS 
Rcspon,lent ("l\'clls1ille Cit:-," hereafter) deems it 
necessary to present a concise statement of the facts of this 
case inasmuch as the stater:rent presented by appellant ("\\right," 
he rea f t e r) Lr i l s . ,,. cur :lt e l\· t o r e r l e c t a 1 l o f t ll c r e l c 1· ant lac t s 
and circrm~tances at issue. 
\\'right is the contract-purcl:ascr of the propcrtv in 
quest i on lLo 1 c i n ( 1 r i :d I ran s c r i r· t , "l I\" h c r e ;r ftc r , at 20 , l inc 
~ 4. I l"ho [1 ropert;· h:ts been annexed ~tncl ~'l'J',lrc·ntl1· :oncd for 
a subdi1·ision. (lR at b, lines 16, 17 and =o.J .\ prcl it.tinarY 
plat 11as caused by !\'right to be prcl'"l·cd :l!1cl ['l '.'SL'lltccl to 
1\'clls\·i!le City's I'Lrnning ~r:1d =oLin·~ Co:nr::is>l~>lt. til\ at 
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lines 3~S.) S:1 id prclili• inary plat 11·as introduced into evidence 
:1s pL1intift.'s l.xhibit ,\o. 1. (TR at 8, lines 15~18.) Said 
preliminary plat was apparently considered by said Planning 
C:oJJIIIiission and on its race indicates that the Commission gave 
1ts approval thereto on August~. 1977. (TR at ll, lines 3~6.) 
There are general notes in the lower left hand corner of 
~aiJ preliminary plat, (plaintiff's Exhibit ~o. l) and General 
~ote No. 5 refers to a letter dated September 23, 1977. (TR 
:1t 8, lines 9~14.) The city engineer appro\·ecl said : reliminary 
!'lat on ::Ocpte~1ber 23, 1977, the same date as said letter (TR at 
1 2, lines 2 3 and ~4 J and said letter was aclmi ttecl into evidence 
.1s plaintiff's Lxhibit No.2 solely as evidence of what the 
c:ity enginc:er reC{uirecl before he would approve the plat and 
, ' I 11· hat c n n c1 i t i on s ll' right agreed to. (TR at 28~29, lines 10~ 
1~, lines 1~3.) Said letter 11as not attached to said preliminary 
.•t::1,hcd .1t :ilL' ti1:1c it 11·as submitted to the city engineer. 
l I :. :1 t 2 9 , 1 1 n r·' S ~ 1 5 . ) In fact, the said Planning Commission 
,·ons 1Jcrcd and :1;1[HL>\'C:cl said plat approximate!;· six l>eeks before 
em at 25' lines 1~3.) 
> ul, "' q u ,, n t 1 :· , l\ r i ~ I, t .: au sed a fin a 1 plat for the first 
J'L:1sv uf its c'\·clop;ncnt to be prepared ancl subn1i tted to the 
L"lt\ 's J'l.1nning Commission, h·hich appro\·ed it. (TR at 14, lines 
3 ~ 
I 
I 
,l 
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13-17.) Said final plat was ~lso submitted to Wellsville's 
City Council, which refused to grant approval. (TR at 14, 
lines 18-22.) 
It became evident after Wright concluded its presentation 
that the refusal on the part of the City Council was well 
justified. No evidence was produced that either the l'lanning 
Commission or the City Council ever accepted the alleged con-
ditions of Wright's September 23, 1977 letter, particularly 
those relating to water line size and location. Additionally, 
Wright's own test.r,,-,,,. demonstrated several ~reas 1d1ere it had 
failed to comply lvi th the City's subdivision and hater ordin-
ances. All other matters cited by \'/right in its statemC'nt of 
the facts are beside these central points; to-wit: Wellsville 
City Council h'as never proven to have accepted the six-inch 
water line proposal, or to even have knoh·n of its existence at 
the time of the :1lleged acceptance; Wright acknowledges its 
refusal to comply with Wellsville City's request concerning 
the provision of water to the proposed development; (TR at 19, 
lines 15-21.) and \•iright's Oh'n testimony demonstrates a f:lilurc 
to c u Iii p l )' 1-i i t h \I.e l l s vi ll e C i t y ' s a p p l i c:l b 1 C' o r d j nan c c s . ( T 1; at 
15-21.) 
After hearing \\'right's evidence :~t the hearing held \!Hell 
~, 1979 and after revieh'l!l~ the ~le or:1nda . uhmi ttcJ b:> the 
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the part ics :tnd the applicable ordinances, the Court issued 
it's ~lenwrandum Decision on .·\pril 2, 1979 and stated: 
~s this Court has recently stated in a 
C:tche County case, Thurston vs. Cache County, 
it is not the position of the Court to substi-
tute its judgment for those charged with making 
a decision under the appropriate ordinances . 
. . . (T)he Court feels that the judgments made 
by the community authorities in regard to the re-
quirements on the final plat as to such item. 2s 
provisions for water for the subdivis10n and ~rov1sions 
for the handling of storm water drainage for the 
subdivision are serious matters and the judgment 
and decision of the local authorities in this mat-
ter will not be changed by the Court in substituting 
its own judgment as to these issues. Therefore, 
the Court holds that what remains is not merely 
a ministerial act but the decisions are discretion-
ary ones and mandamus will, therefore, not lie and 
defendant's ~lotion to Dismiss is hereby granted. 
The Court then proceeded to enter appropriate Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order Denying Writ of 
""ndamus and Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint . 
. \RCU~Il.'H 
I'OI\T I. APPELLANT fi\S TilE BURDEN TO SHOW 
ITS CLI.\R .\:\D INDISPUTABLE RIGHT TO THE 
I S:iU.\10[1. Ol A WRIT OF ~1ANDAI·IUS AS REQUIRED 
1:1 L.\\\ .. \:,LJ >1.\:\D.\riUS DOLS NOT LIE TO Cm-IPEL 
Till I'Lint1JZI!\:\CI OF DISCPETIONARY ACTS. 
I h c a p p c l 1 :1 n t , h a 1· in g m o \' e d the T r i J.l Court for the 
.. ,ll.tncc o( :t 1\ri t n( illandamus requiring the respondent to 
"1'1'~•'1'<' the Cin:tl pLtt of the appellant, is confronted with 
- 5-
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with the fact that the rule that the burden of proof rests 
upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue applies 
in Mandamus proceedings (52 Am. Jur. 2d 786, Sec. 466, Burden 
of Proof). 
It goes on in the same section to state the following: 
Thus, the burden is upon the applicant ~~ho1::_ 
that his right to the issuance of the writ is clear and 
indisputable and, except as to allegations that are 
adm1tted by the answer or otherwise, he must prove 
every fact that is the foundation of his proceeJing. 
lie must show an enforceable right; an imperative duty 
of the respondent to perform; the authority, ability, 
and means of the respondent to perform; a breach or 
nonperformance by the respondent of his duty; the 
lack of :l!lother plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; 
the performance l•r compliance with necessary conJi-
tions precedent, including, where necessary, a Jemand 
for performance and a refusal thereof; and, if the 
duty in question is discretionary, that there was 
an aribtrary exercise or abuse of discretion. 
([mphasis added.) 
In 52 Am. Jur. 2d 360, Sec. 35, "Caution in Granting''. 
it states: 
The function of mandamus is to compel action 
by the respondent, and it cannot be employeJ to 
adjudicate and establish rights or define duties. 
The courts act with caution with respect to the 
wr1t and award it onl in cases where it clearlv 
~pears tatun or t e law 1t oug t to issue, u)1on 
a ~ shovnng as to the appllcant'Srlght, and 
the respondent's duty. (l:mphasis added.) 
In 52 .\Ill .Jur. 2d 388, Sec. 6-l, "1\cquirement that right he 
clear, certain and complete", it states: 
The function of rnanda1.rus Js not to estat-lish 
rightS , bUt t 0 C 11 f 0 I' C C r i c: h t S t i: :t t h a\' l" b l"l' II C S t:d1 
lished. To ~V:nrant the i~suan 1-c c·f thl' hrit, rl:'t 
only IIIUSt there hl' ,r lc_.a] r:,:;l:t 111 t!r:· :c'Ltt•'l, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
but, owing to the extraordinary and drastic 
ch:Ir:Icter of mandamus and the caution exercised 
by courts 1n :1wanling it, it is also in>portant 
that the r1ght sought to be enforced be clear 
and certain. There must be an imr:1ediate right 
to have the act in question performed, and such 
right must be specific, well defined, and com-
plete, so as not to admit of any reasonable 
controversy. The writ does not issue if the 
right in uestion is doubtful 
or quail 1c ; nor 1 sue r1g t 
dent; has been lost or barred by 
or there is a substantial defect in the proof 
the relator's right. (Emphasis added.) 
ln 52 i\m Jur. 2d 397, Sec. 76, "Discretionary cr per-
rr1issable duties or acts", it states: 
The duties which fall within the scope of 
mandamus are legal duties of a specific, imperative 
and ministerial character, and in the absence of 
statute which validly may be enacted, the writ will 
not issue to compel the performance of discretionary 
acts. 1\ith respect to duties that are not peremptory, 
'f1leofficer must be left free to decide whether he 
will perform the act demanded or secure by appropriate 
procedure a judicial determination of the extent of 
his duty. l'he performance of an act which is merely 
recornrnended by a superior authority mily not be compel-
led by mandamus. 
Discretion, as thus intended, means the power 
or right conferred upon the respondent by law, of 
acting officially under certain circumstances 
3cco1·Jinn to the dictates of his own judgment and 
conscien~c, and not controlled by the judgment or 
conscience of others. It arises when the act in 
qucstic>n m;~y be performed in one oL two ;;ays, either 
ol 11hich 11ould be· lah·ful, and it is left to the will 
ol the· ;•cl (ol'IIIl'J to determine in 11·h.ich 1,·ay it shall 
be dune. (l:n•ph:tsis i!dded.) 
In 52 .\r:r. Jur 2d 399, Sec. 78, "Control or review 
u( discretion", 1t sLttcs: 
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Thus, mandamus 11· ill not lie to control t ht· 
discretion oC :1 court or jJJdicial oCCiccr, or tu 
co111pel its exercise in a parti culclr m:1nnc·r, except 
in those rare instances Khen under the facts it 
can be legally e:>.crcised in but one 11av, nor 1s it 
a proper remedy to control acts ol govcnmental bodies 
when acting 1,· it hi n the scope o f t he i r l ega l p 0\V c r s . 
Nandamus is not an instrument for the instruction 
of ¥ubhc ofl1cers as to the m:1nncr 1n h'l_!J__c_!_l_theJ:_ 
sna 1 ch s charge d u t 1 c s 1d11 c h c a I 1 !oT11\c ex e r c 1 s c 
of Jiscret1on, as lfiStu1gU1shed from the performance 
of ministerial duties. -------
\ihere, as to the facts, there exists any adrlis-
sihle doubt, 01 1:here reasonable ":en JJ~g_ht conscien-
tious]' differ with respect to discretion or the 
a sence t. e:·eo , t 1e courts 1a1c 111t 1 ~ractt-cai 
unan1m1 ty decl"l'T]c I~1n~'l'__fere bv man arnus-;-;md 
11henever an elc,•::·:·nt oi0Iscretion enters 1ntotne 
duty to be performed, the functions of mandatory 
authority are short of their customary potency and 
become po1verless to dictate tern<s to that discretion. 
The court is without power to sub5titute its dis-
ere ti on for that of a pub_l_~~_<:Jfj1C cr o_~odv, or 
h·here the act 1s dlscretic-il,lt)', to Jll'cctthat it 
be performed in a specified manner. [Elnphasis added.) 
l n 5 2 Am . .J u r . 2 d 4 0 6 , Sec . 8 3 , "Duty sub j e c t to p c r -
formance of conJiti0ns precedent," it states: 
l'crforn;:lnce bv the relator u[ all acts that arc 
conditions precedc~t to the impos1tion of a duty on 
the respondent is essential in order to give rise 
t o t he r 1 ,; h t t o ~1 a n rid rn us , an d t he 1, r i t ,,,· i l l no t 
i~;sue a~_tinst a J'_,Jblic olfici:lluilt!T~;-;;c-_ri'Jl!in~ 
hac' G,·cn Jonc tl1at 1s ncccssarv in c)rJcr'- to r.ukc 
} f !1~110(; rlTI~ u t \' -~0 a ct."-[Tiilp h a s-1;- :1 c1J l; d . 
. \dd1 tionallv, i n ,--;a v i c r s 1· s . l;icl:cy 1~65 
(ldahll, 1~"-lj, 1 t ',l:ltL' 
.\ hrit Ul li.,tnd,ttc_ LJ]} 1:--;:>lll' !(. 
,! C.: lc: J r ll".' ll 1 i h t t ,, h :1 \ c t h L , c •, t 
I ; '.1 I t }' \·,' )!\J )J aS 
l I'' I "ICc! I I 
t h c o f 1 i c l' t :1 :c: a 1 : 1 s t •,-, h o: · t I 1 r· 1·, r 1 t •, () ll ~ ·. il t l1 ; l :..:. ~~ 
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duty to act and if the act be ministerial and not 
require the exercise of discretion." 
~inally, this Court has, in the case of Rose vs. Plymouth 
lo1m, 173 P. 2d 285, 286 (Utah, 1946), stated: 
l•landamus ~Vill not lie to compel the perfor-
mance of acts necessarilv involvino the exercise 
of judgment and discreti~n on the ~art of the 
officer, board or commission at ~Vhose hands per-
formance is desired. The court may, under proper 
circumstances, require an inferior tribunal to 
exercise its discretion but will not prescribe 
ho\V it shall do so. The court cannot substitute 
its o1m judgment for that of the tribunal to hhich 
the discretion \Vas committed by la\V. The hrit can 
be used only to compel an officer or town officials 
to perform a duty, a ministerial act or an admin-
istrative act, about which it would have no discretion. 
The foregoing statement of the law very clearly sets forth 
the burden of proof 1\'hich must be met by appellant in orJer to 
qualify for the relief it seeks. It is respondent's contention, 
as illustrated below, that appellant failed to meet its burden 
of proof; and that in any event discretionary acts are at issue. 
l'OI:d I l. c\Pl'ELL.\NT FAILED TO liHT THE BURDEN 
0~ PROOF REQVI RI:D FOR Tf:E RELIEF SOUGHT; FURTHER-
~Ir'RI, TilE ,\Pl'LL.\1.1.:\T 'S REQUEST FOR RELIEF DLALS 
~ITH .\CTS ~HICH ARE DISCRETIO\ARY I\ RESPO\DENT. 
l n light of the la1> as set forth above, it is respondent's 
i'•'~ it ion th:Il appellant has not met its burden to show that its 
r1::ht r,, the issllance of the ld·it is clear and indisputable. 
In its t•ricf ,;n "J';'c:!l, :1ppellant states the lal\ as holding that 
.:·" sul•di\·Jdcr corr.plics 1·:ith :111 the require,Icnts of valid 
I· 
, u 1. c1 i 1 · 1 ~ 1 0 11 L , lll t 1 0 1 1:1 1\, , r e g u l a t i on s :1 n J o r J i nan c e s , a p p r ova 1 I 
9 ~ 
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of the p 1 at b c co 111 c s a 1n in is t e r, :tl :t c t . (:\['J'l'llant's J:ricf 
at 8-9.) In l'aragr:tph 4 of appellant's Complaint, appellant 
alleges that it h~s so complied with all conditions valiJl~ 
imposed by the respondent and with state l~w and respondent's 
ordinances. The statements in and of themselves demonstrate the 
fatal defect in appellant's case, i.e. before a ministerial 
approval can be demanded compliance must be shown. Appellant 
failed to show such compliance during its presentation. In 
fact, appellant failed to cite even one of the particular laws 
or ordinances by name or by reference that it claimed to have 
complied 1vith or th:tt ,, It \':as not until 
appellant h:rd rested that rcspondcnt',2 counsel, during argument 
on the ~lotion to Dismiss presented copies of applic:1blc oniln-
anccs to the Trial Court. (II: a t ~ 0 , ~ ~ . I Cupics of respondent'· 
s u b d i \' i s ion and h' a t c r o r d i nan c c s h' c r c s u h 111 1 t t c d t o t h c I r i :11 
Court at its request b) respondent w·ith its >len:orandut:t Jn ~up-
port of 01o t ion to I' i c m i s s . The rssue oJ their validity is de:dt 
with in !'oint JII below·. l(eference hill not be J.tadc thereto for 
Jl u r Jl o s e c; o [ i 11 us t r a t i. n g w· he r c i 11 a I' pc 1 1 a 11 t h a s f :1 i lc· d t o c cH 1 p 1 ,. 
thcrn.ith. 
Reference is ::,ad<e to Chlljltcr 3, "l'rL'luninary l'lat ," of 
the Subdivision L1rdin:Lttcc, Section 3 113) ("1, \,hL'l'l' tt state:-;· 
3. 
( g ) . \ t L' n l a t i n: !' Lt r 1 o r :: l' t J h ·.- \·. !·. l c lt 
the srtbdt\'Jclcr !''''lJlCl'L"\ to h:t:rc!IL· tc•r: \ .. tr .. 
IU 
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cl ra in:t~c fur the subdivision.,. (Emphasis added.) 
It goes on to state im111ediatcly thereafter: 
. ~here necessary, copies of any agreements 
with adJacent property owners relevant to the 
proposed subdivision shall be presented to the 
Planning Commission." 
Additional reference is made to Chapter 4, "Final 
l'lat," of the Subdivision Ordinance, Section 4-1, where it 
states: 
The pLtt shall contain all information 
required on the preliminary plat except contours ... 
By appellant's own admission through Mr. Wright and 
;.Jr. liall ~>hile testifying, no such plan is shown on its pre-
1 i m i 11:1 r )' p l a t . (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. l.) No such plan is 
shoh'n on the 1-inal Plat either. (l'laintiff's Exhibit No. 3.) 
It h'as not stated and is not knoh'n if it is intended that 
clr;tinagc is to be obtained outside the boundaries of the pro-
posed subdivision. If such is the plan agreements must be 
[l!oduc:ed hi th adj accnt land owners granting permission for 
Given the proposed size of appellant's subdivision 
:ttrd its location in the l'rcllsville foothills, the plan for handlinl 
s t C' r n h at c r d r:t in a g c 1 s o f great concern and not to be de a 1 t 
1\1 t h l i g h t l }' . 1 t is h'i thin the respondent's prerogative and 
111 fact is :1 legal duty itilposed by ordinance, to require that 
.lJli''·ll:tnt shoh e\·idcnce of its right to discharge the storn, 
'...ttc·r ,,nto a,lj:tccnt propcrt)· if such is intended and its plan 
IL't clrain:1~C: in :tn\· c\·ent, gi\·en the provisions of respondent's 
- I I -
I 
I 
il 
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Appellant's preliminar)· plat shoKs appellant is re~ 
taining protection strips bet1veen its property and that of 
adjacent landowners. Chapter 6, Section 6~3 of the Sub~ 
Ji-.·ision Ordinance al loKs the retention o C such a st r i !l o C lan,!, 
but requires that an agreement be made by the subdiv i .:cr set~ 
ting forth the circumstances under which such a strip Kill be 
deeded in the future. Said section requires that one copy 
of the agreement be submitted by the city attorney, after 
approval by him, to the Planning Commission prior to the 
approval of final ~1 • By appellant's uh'n ad11:ission, this 
was not done and has n ··t L>een done. 
At the hearing o!· this matter i t h" a s e s t a b 1 i s h c· cl b)' 
0 I r . \'! r i g h t ' s t e s t i m on y t h :1 t t he a p p c l l an t i s n o t t he f c e t i t l e 
OJ.>"Tler of the property it seeks to subJiv ide, but is the con~ 
tract purchaser of the sa111e. ,\ p pella n t ' s I' i n a l l' 1 at contains 
an 0\\"llc;·'s dedication, executed by "Robert)>!. \\"right, !'resident, 
\\' r i g h t D n· e 1 o pm c 11 t Com p any . " A p p e ll an t , i n i t s C Olil p l a i n t he r e in . 
states in Paragraph 2 thereof that it is " .the Ohner of a 
tract of land ... ". Such is not the: ca~c for purposes of an 
o l·m e r ' s d c d i c:t t i o 11 :1 s required b'" res pun J c n t ' s Sub cl i vis ion 
t1rdirl:tnce :~nd state lah. 
lt :'haJJ Uc· lctl·.fuJ for :tll\" 0\.lll'I ut ~ill d t c 
lay out :JrHI ]'lat ~uc], l:tnd 
streets, :illc·\·:o :11td J>UI•ltc· 
l 9 S 3) [I 111 ;' h :1 s is add c d J 
I : 
1ntn )1]1JlL-.;, )11ts, 
'l :J l l' I 5.. ) . I ll . l" \. 
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The :)tate lah· then provides: 
\\'hon8ver any lands are hereafter so laid out and 
platted the owner of the same shall cause to be 
madc_an accurate map or plat thereof, particularly 
settrng forth and describing: 
(1) All the parcels of ground so laid out 
and platted, by their boundaries, course and extent, 
and whether they are intended for streets, alleys or 
other public uses, together with such as may be re-
served for public purposes. 
(2) ~11 blocks and lots Intended for sale, by 
numbers, and then- precise length and 1-:idth." 
(57-5-2 U.C.A. 1953) (Emphasis added] 
After the map or plat is made, the statute requires 
that the same, 
... be ackno\\ledged by such owner before some 
offrcer authorized by laws to take the acknow-
ledgment of conveyances of real estate ... (57-
5-3 U.C.\. 1953). (Emphasis added.] 
then in 57-5-4 lJ.C .. \. 1953, it is provided that: 
Such maps and plats, when made, acknowledged, filed 
and recorded, shall operate as a dedication of all 
such streets, alleys and other public places, and 
shall vest the fee of such parcels of land as are 
therein expresseJ, named or intended for l;lllblic uses 
in such county, crty or town for the public for the 
uses therein named or intended. (Emphasis added] 
Ch:1pter 4, Final Flat, Section 4-1 (1) (g), of Ordinance 
,; t :I t "s : 
(l) Description and delineation. The final Plat 
shall show: (g) !he dedrcatron to the city of all 
s t n· e t s and high" a:· s included in the proposed sub -
J i \'is ion. 
It is c le:tr frol'J these references that the o1mer of a 
i', '):'ll~l'J suilcl1 \'is 1011 '"ust Jedic::lte the streets and highways 
- l ~-
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within a subdivi:;[on to the citv and that the title to be 
acquired by the city by virtue of such dedic·:,tion is a 
fee title. 
TJ,c question then becomes whether arpellant can convey 
a fee title to this property by virtue of its signing, 
acknowledging and recording the subdivision plat. The 
answer to this question is that appellant could only give 
in its dedication what it has and it does not have the fee 
title. For the respondent to obtain the fee title as the 
statute, 57-5-4 U.C.A., 1953 and its ordinance requires, 
h"ould mean the fee t 1 t::.c holder from v.ho:n appellant is pur-
chasing this propert~ on contract, would have to join as a 
party to the dedication proceedings of the subdivision rlat. 
The fee title oh"ners are not parties to the final rlat and as 
submitted, appellant's plat does not colilply v.·i th the :tpplicable 
ov.·nership dedication requirement of Utah Ln.• and defendant's 
ordinance. 
Appellant contends that its Exhibit :Jo. 2, the letter 
signed by 0lr. \•:right e1nd dated September 23, 1977, is leg:1lh 
bindin~. :J s a list of the con eli t ions the re:;pond<:n t rcqui red 
and .1pecd to as :l condition to -;igning :Jr>pc'lLtnt's l'rcl[ll:inan 
Plat . Y e t a p p c 11 ant ' s o v.· n t e s t i m on y fa i J c: d t " s h u '' t I: ( "c con -
d i t i on s '' c r e e v e r a c c e p t e d b v r c s ron d c n t ' s l' J il n n 1 n :: an d = on i n ~ 
Conu,Jission or City Council, 'lr by ,11n·one otJ 1 cr than rcc'jlOlldcnt'S 
-11-
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t h c n ;1 c t i n g c [ t 1· c n g j n c c r , said l c t t c r b car i n g a d at c h' hi c h 
h'as approxinra tely six weeks after respondent's Planning Com-
mission signed appellant's Preliminary Plat (Sec plaintiff's 
l.xhibit No. l). Respondent is not altering requirements as 
claimed by appellant, appellant is simply claiming the imposi-
of conditions that were never imposed or accepted by respondent 
in sa[d letter. The letter does deal with issues of lcgiti-
mate concern to respondent in the proposed development, but 
the letter has not been shown to be a statement of conditions 
1·csponden t imposed and is bound to. 
In particular, appellant is claiming that respondent 
accepted and is bound by the six-inch water line proposal con-
tained in said letter. The most that can be said is that re-
spondent's then city engineer accepted the proposal. The fact 
is that neither the city engineer, nor the Planning Coi:lmission 
has the authority to bind the respondent with respect to its 
". ;1 t L' r s y s t c 111 • The control of said system is held exlusively 
by the City Council of respondent. Reference is made to 
~cL·t ions 25 ;~nd 43 of the respondent's \'later Ordinance, which 
-tate: 
25. Lxtcnsion of \\later or Seh·cr ~lains Within 
the Ci tv. ,\nv person or persons, 1nclulling any sub-
Jl\·liJe/~ desii·ing to have the 1vater or sewer mains 
c x t c n ,I e d ". i t h i n t h c C i t y , a n d b e in g \·1 i ll in g to a J -
vance the whole expense of such extension, andre-
ccii'C the return of an agreeJ portion thereof, as 
hereinafter proviJed, may make a description of such 
l'roposcJ extension accompanied by a map showing the 
location thcrcuf, h'hi ch petition shall also conta1n 
an offer tu ad\·ance the whole expense of making the 
same ;Is saiJ expense shall be certified by the water 
supcrintcnJcnt. The City Council may grant or Jeny 
, .llll pL' t 1 c 1011 as in its Jisc ret ion seems best for 
t ltc hl' 1 f:t rc of existing 1'ater and sewer users in the 
- l s -
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City. 
43. Unuer Control of the Cit,· C:uu!ll: i l. 
water works and sewer system constJ·uctcJ, Okned, and 
controlled by this City to supplv the municipality and 
the citizens thereof ll'ith kater ancl se11·er services ~hall 
be known anJ Jesignatecl as the Cit;· \'!ater l\'orks :Inu the 
City Sewer System; they shall be the propcrt,· c1C the 
Citv and shall be under the sole and exclu~i\~ control 
of the Ci tv Council, who may froni-tliiletOtTI-IIelrr~ 
tTi:e construction of such reservo1rs, 1\':.Jter tanks, water 
mains fire hvurants, se1ver connections, outf:.~ll lines 
and f;cilitie~ of every description, as the necessities 
of the inhabitants of the City may rcc4uire.LLmphasis aclded. 
Section 10-7-14, U.C.A., provides enabling legislation for 
the above and states: 
Rules anJ Regulations for Use of 1\'atcr. Lvery 
city and town may enact ordinances, rules anJ regu-
lations for the management and concluct of the \,·a ter-
works system owned anJ controlleu by it. 
Appell an t ' s c \' 1 d c· n c e fa i 1 e cl to s h 0\v a p p c ll ant ' s co III p 1 i an c c 
with said Section 25 an0 failed to show any acceptance by the 
responclent, said paragraph 4 fails to adequ:.~tely an.' o.:ompletch 
set forth the necessary det:.~ils 1·1 urder t0 .tscc·r·Llin the obli-
gations of the parties. Inasmuch as the pro\'is1on oJ hider in 
Jdequate quantities ~tn,l o[ sufficient qu:ll1ty is :I lcgitii:t:Jtc 
concern of res:'u"Jc· 1,t :wei a matter within the 
and d i s c r c t ion o f t h c· r c s p on cl en t 1 s c i t y l: o un c 1 1 , a p p c 1 1 a 11 t ' ' r c · 
quest for ~I.In,l·It.!IIS rs not hell founded 1._hcre :Ippc·11ant has f:lll 
~In J r c r u' c ,l t u c ll 111 p 1 :.· h. i t II res pun J c n t I s l c , : 1 t 1 Iii a t c' r c' q t 1 c· :. t s a II c 
rcqtill'C'illC'Ilts th~1t t'rior to respondent's :IJ'['rol·al of ·'I'J'Cll:tnt's 
fiJLI] pLit, dppclLint dciiil'llStratc ~I 11 d :1hil:t\· ~Ir:d \,I]!Jn ness 
t 0 sup p 1 :· ~I s ll r [ i ( i C' Il t \' 0 1lll:l c aIl J 4 u a l 1 t \' 0 I ·,,:It c I 
I I• 
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to its proposed subdivision, so that culinary, fire and 
irrigation needs can be met. 
Finally, appellant seems to claim that once an 
approval has been obtained at any stage in the proceeding 
the respondent is forever estopped from attempting to cor-
rect oversights or outright violations of its ordinances. 
In response, the respondent submits that it is axiomatic 
that the respondent has the pov:er to regulate and control 
tl1e subdivision of property within its corporate boundaries 
as a lawful exercise of its police powers for the promotion 
:tnd protection of the general welfare and well-being of 
present and future residents of the respondent. (See Sec. 
10-9-25 U.C.A. 1953) This, the respondent has done by appro-
plate ordinance, and it grants the authority to review proposed 
developments and impose reasonable conditions prior to giving 
ojlprovals for the developer to proceed with his development. 
In 82 Am. Jur. 2d 665, Section 166, it states: 
·rhe legislative provisions for subdivision controls 
usually specify, either broadly or in more or less 
dectil, the standards and considerations for the 
review of subdivision plats, and the reviewing board 
itself may have the discretion to frame detailed 
standards or requirements. Thus, where it is within 
its deleg~•ted authority, the reviewing authority may 
consider, or the local governing body or reviewing 
~tuthori ty may impose conditions concerning the 
dedication or reservation of land; proposed streets 
and higl11,ays, and the dedication of land therefor; 
l''tr~s, pl:•n~rounds, and recrcJtional areas: educational 
l:~lrlitics, h':rtcr ,;upply, dr,tinagc :rrrd ~c1·:crs; the 
,ll':lll:tl,ility of utility sen'iccs; processing and 
-1 7-
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and inspection fees; and performance bonds. Also, 
in reviewing a subdivision plat :tnd impos1ng 
conditions, the reviewing authorit,· llliiY consider 
ho~ the newly platted area would tic in with or 
affect adjacent or outside areas. 
Section 7-2 of the city's Subdivision Ordinance states: 
The Planning Commission, the City Council and suclt 
other departments and agencies of city government as 
are specified under the provisions of this title 
are hereby designated and authorized as the agencies 
charged with the enforcement of the provisions of 
this title and shall enter such actions in court as 
are necessary. Failure of such dejlartments t~..:_sue 
~ppro~:.!._~e"~l~:_EC_dies ,~hal_.l__~_t_legc:_lize ~ 
violation of such provisions. [Emphas1s addcd.J 
Chapter 4, .'-;cction 2(g) of said Subdivision Ordinance 
requires that the cit1 .>:lJrtlcy's and City Council's "Ccrti-
fi.cates of Appro\·Cll" be on the final plat. They an both vi tall:: 
involved in the enforcement of said Ordinance, and · ,_, both 
in t e g r o 1 1 inks in t h c pro c e s s t he ,! t": c 1 up c r 1:1 us t I '• J 1 ow to 
gain appropriate approvals. Yet, the m~11n thrust of appellant's 
argument seems to be that neither can exercise any discretion 
nor fulfill their role h'hich requires the111 to enforce the pro· 
visions of said Ordinance. Apparently, for whatever reason, 
a drainage plan wZts not incorporated in :1nd included as a part 
of appellant's preli111inary plat. lhc;t does not obviate the 
absolute Jtccd Cor one, It ell· uoes it forc\·er prec lucie the res 
from rcqui ring one if it is reasonably necessa1·1·, cspcc 1 ally 
g i V en t h l' p r e 1 i m i n a r y s t e1 g e a ! ' p c J 1 a 11 t ' s p r 01 c c t 1 s 1 11 . .\s can 
be noted h hi l e read in g s a i d S u h J 1 1· i 5 i 0 n u r d i n a 11 c , , s c 1·, r :tl s t c r' 
- 1 s 
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1nust be taken and approvals obtained and several agencies, 
hoards, commissions or people are charged with its enforcement. 
They serve as checks and balances to each other and an over-
sight by one should not be construed as a wai\'er and estoppel, 
particularly with respect to said necessary improvements. 
The appellant's argument that the respondent cannot compel 
a committment to install certain improvements prior to the 
approval of the development is without merit. The appellant's 
proposed subdivision encompasses 78 lots with potentially many 
more people than that who will reside therein, and covers sev-
eral acres in the foothills somewhat removed from present pop-
ulation concentrations. The question is not one of the desir-
ability of adequate drainage, access and water supply. The 
desirability and necessity of these items are beyond question 
in this case. It is really a question of who should pay for 
them and at what point the appellant can be required to demon-
strate adequate provision for them. 
The appellant's act in attempting to secure approval of 
his plats is voluntary. No law requires him to subdivide his 
land and sell it by plat. The fact that adequate water must be 
del1vered to his property for 78 homes, the fact that adequate 
:1cccss must be pro\' idee.! thereto, the fact that protective 
strip agrcc111ents must be made, and the fact that an adequate 
d r a in :q; e 5 y 5 t c 111 m u 5 t be provide cl are a 11 n e c e s s it i e s which are 
-19-
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specifically and uniquely attributable to appel];Lnt's activities. 
But for appellant's proj~ct, there would be no need for any of 
the suggested improvements. 
It is submitted that the exact plan for water supply, 
drainage, etc. is unique to each proposed development. Tlte 
respondent is vested with authority to review each such proposed 
development within its corporate boundaries and within an 
exercise of reasonable discretion impose conditions and exact 
certain committments, prior to granting approval, that are 
deemed necessary for the protection of the general health 
and welfare of the community as a whole and the development 
in particular. Tl1e i u··.~en is on the appellant to demonstrate 
the unreasonable and arbitrary nature of the conditions im-
posed and committments requested, if such is the claim made 
by appellant. To this effect, tLi ~ Court has stated, in 
Child vs. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d (18-+, 186 (1975), the 
following: 
Courts s'wuld interfere with determinations 
of city council only when the decisions or actions 
taken are clearly outside the authority of the 
council, or are so wholly unreasonable and unjust 
that they must be deemed. capricious and arbitrary 
in adversely affectino someone's riohts. 
' ' t> !:> 
Respondent submits that it is clear on the record that 
appell:lllt did not nteet the exacting burden of proof exacted 
upon a request for a Writ of Mandamus, particularly where, as 
in this case, the 1\'ri t 1s sought to compel the perfontJ.llCC of 
discretionary acts. 
- 2 0-
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POINT III. AT ALL TINES PERTINENT TO THIS ACTION 
RLSPON!JJ:CJT HAD IN EFFECT, VALIDLY ENACTED SUE-
D!\'! S !ON AND WATH ORDINANCLS. 
Point III is a restatement of Finding No. 13 of the 
Trial Court. Appellant objected to said finding. Respon-
dent directs the Court's attention to Rule 9(2) (b), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Said Rule 9 is entitled "Facts Which ~1ust or 
~lay be Judicially Noticed" and Section 2 thereof provides in 
pertinent part: 
(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request 
by a party, of ... (b) ... duly enacted ordinances 
... of governmental subdivisions ... of this state ... 
Appellant's Complaint, at Paragraph 4 thereof, alleged 
that appellant had complied with respondent's ordinaces that 
apply to appellant's final plat; appellant's Memorandum in Sup-
JlOrt of said Complaint cites law which speaks of valid subdi-
vision control laws; and appellant's amendment to its Complaint, 
in Paragraph 2 thereof, alleged a contention had arisen be-
tween plaintiff and defendant " ... concerning the interpre-
t:lt ion of the City Ordinances which are applicable." Two 
legal ~lemoranda 1vere filed with the Court by appellant after 
it filed the amendment to its Complaint. At the time of 
responJent' s oral ~lotion to Dismiss at the conclusion of the 
J'resentation of appellant's evidence in the hearing on this 
r.t:r t ter, respondent's counsel referred to the ordinances of 
respondent hhich :ne applicable and the Court requested copies 
,tat ing it could t:rke judicial notice of the same if there were 
-21-
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no objections. No specific objections thereto have been 
raised by appellant until the filing of its brief on appeal 
herein, notwithstanding ample opportunity to do so. Fven 
now, after referring to Section 25 of respondent's water 
ordinance and generally stating that the entire water ordinance 
is invalid, appellant's brief merely states that: 
Part of plaintiff's contentions are that the 
applicable ordinances are not all valid. 
(Appellant's Brief at p. 14.) 
More specific prayers for relief, objections, and 
reasons for im·alidl ty would seem to be required. ln any 
event, the Trial Court properly took judicial notice of 
respondent's Subdi1·i:. i ,1n .• nd Water Ordinances and the Trial 
Court's finding and subsequent order adequately disposes 
of appellant's request for declaratory relief inasmuch as 
it found the ordinances to be valid and enforceable. This 
issue is dealt with in Point lV belo1v. 
!'OINT IV. APPELLANT'S PRAYER FOR LJECLARX!ORY 
RFLIEF WAS ,\NSIVERED BY TilE TRIAL COURT AND 
.\PPLLL\NT W.'IS 1\EQUlRED TO CClrlPLY IVIT!i UGITI-
~IAH CONlllTlO.b i~IPOSED BY APPLIC.\BLL llRlilNANCLS 
,\ND RLSPONDENT. 
It is apparent from appellant's brief that \\right is not 
lhat fact Jocs 
not cl e t r a c t fro lll t he c l a r i t y and clef i n i t u 1 c s s o f t h c l r Lil 
Court's decision. The decision is cl~e:1r upon a rcadinc; o[ 
the ~lemorandum Decision, l'indings, Conclusio:J•; :tJJci 1.trdc1. 
1\ppellant is found to hav<: failed t<J co::.i ]I· 1·.1 ti1 lc,, 1 tHJ:ttc 
requirements of the rCSJ•ondent and J(·, ,,,,JJJ.t:>ecs. lite 
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Ordinctnccs are [ound to be valid and effective; and in particu-
lar, it is found that appellant must comply with the respon-
dent's requirements as to an eight inch water line. 
On page 8 of its brief, appellant contends that there 
~as no evidence presented to show such a water line was 
reasonable or necessary. Respondent submits that appellant is 
attempting, without legal basis, to shift its burden of proof to 
respondent. It is appellant who must first present evidence that 
it is unreasonable and unnecessary. 
Appellant presented no evidence whatsoever that the 
requested eight (8) inch line is not necessary to adequately 
service its development. Appellant has merely suggested that 
such a requirement is invalid according to general law, state 
la~ and respondent's own ordinances and because of the expense 
involved. Appellant fails to cite any of respondent's ordin-
c1nccs or state law to support this bald assertation. Appellant 
Joes cite some cases, from jurisdictions far removed from this 
locality, to support his contentions, but failed to present any 
evidence that anyone but appellant would benefit from the 
proposed line extension. Through it all, appellant seems to 
be claiming that the respondent should provide and pay for 
all necessary improvements which are outside the boundaries of 
c1ppc 11 c1n t 's proposed subdivision. Such a requirement could 
\cty nearly bankrupt a city such as respondent, given the large 
.Jrc·.1s for development within its corporate limits, or at least 
-23-
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put a very heavy and unjustified burden on Jlresent residents 
thereof. 
The general la~ with respect to the extension of a 
municipal water system within the boundaries of the municipal-
it y is found in 7 8 Am . J u r. 2 d 91 0 - 11 , w· h i c h s tate s : 
Although there exists, of course, a basic underlying 
obligation of a municipal corporation owning a general 
domestic water system to supply impartially all 
applicants in substantially like position to those 
being served, it has quite generally been held or 
recognized that a municipality exercises a dis-
cretionary function in deciding whether or not to 
extend its system to an entirely new section within 
its territorial limits, and cannot be compelled to 
do so at the instance of a prospective consumer, at 
least if its basis for refusing is in any way reason-
able and does not, therefore, involve any abuse of 
discretion, or arbitrary or fraudulent action. When 
factors such as physical remoteness of the local~ 
1n which service 1s sought and d1s ro ort1onate expen.e 
arc present, t e exerc1se o 1scret1on 1n re us1ng 
to make water system extensions is \·erv generally 
bphel~. Even apparently reasonable extensions have 
eld properly within the discretionary power of 
a municipality to refuse. [t:Jnphasis added.) 
Such law· can \{ell be extended to other types of impro\·eJi,cnt· 
a city is called upon to make. Respondent has nc~er denied 
appellant the right of access to its water supplv not other 
municipal se1vices; it has onl)· requested that appellant make 
,1Jcquc1tl' Cc 1 n\'C)';lltce L1cilitics, without ,letril:.ent to c.\isting 
user~. 
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d e a l t \\ i t h t he c ~~ s e o f an i n d i v i d u a l who c 1 a i me d t he a b s o 1 u t e , 
vested right to the extention of the city's water lines at 
city expense merely because he was an occupant of premises 
within the town limits. In response to such a contention the 
Court stated: 
... Hut the plaintiff contends that the town 
board has no discretion in the matter and that 
he has a clear, legal and vested right by virtue 
of the fact that his premises are within the 
town limits. He makes the contention that the 
town is bound to supply every inhabitant within 
its limits with water. If this contention is 
ri ht, the conse uence is that the town board, 
actin or t e town, is le all oun to l 
water to al In a Itants, no matter ow 
ruinous and destructive the result might 
be. The unsoundness of this contention is 
easily demonstrable. The testimony of ex-
pert engineers IS not necessary to satisfy a 
reasonable mind that to compel a town to 
supply water to all inhabitants regardless 
of cost might create a burden which could 
not be borne. It should be kept in mind 
that this is not a case where a resident of 
the municipality is attempting to compel 
the city authorities to make a connection 
from its water main already laid in the 
street in front of his residence, nor is it an 
attempt to compel them to merely turn the 
valve and permit the water to flow into his 
house as in Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. 
Logan City, 97 Utah 235, 92 P.2d 346. 
Unless the town authorities are 
shown to have failed to exercise judgment 
or discretion such that a refusal to extend 
the water system would be unreasonable 
their decision is final. See Lawrence v. 
Richard, ll ~le.95, 88 A. 92, 47 L.R.A:, 
.\.S., 654, and note Greenwood v. Provine, 
~upra. The record does not reveal such 
~rbitrary action. Therefore, the JUdgment . 
of the town officials is conclusrve. Ii this 
- 2 5-
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were a case where the town authorities had 
refused to connect the plaintiff's residence 
to a main already laid or if the plaintiff 
had financed the cost of the extension and 
agreed to accept water at the prescribed 
rates in payment therefor, the remedy 
might lie, because the writ would then be 
for the purpose of compelling the town to 
perform a duty, a ministerial act about 
which it would have no discretion. But 
such is not this suit. The effort here is to 
compel the extension of the water system a 
considerable distance under circumstances 
which call for reason and judgment and 
the exercise of discretion and are not 
ministerial. ~landamus will not lie. 
Rose vs. Plymouth Town, supra, at 286,7. 
[emphasis added.] 
The correlL1t LOr' 1'2t,,·een the Rose case and this is 
direct. If the respondent cannot compel the appellant to 
lay the required line, then the obvious implication of 
appellant's argument is that respondent must lay it to 
appellant's boundaries. It is to be noted that appellant 
never raises evidence directed to the reasonableness of respon-
dent's h'ater line requirements, it only questions the rcasonahlc-
ness of requiring appellant to pay therefore. To require 
that respondent or any other city or town provide improvements 
to a proposed subdivision is to place an unrcasonblc and 
unrenable burden thereon. Simply to st3tc the proposition 
is to demonstrate its unreasonableness. 
r he fa c t i s , that a 1 on g 11 i t h the p 0 v: e r to rca son J. b 1 v 
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control the subdivision of property, as has been shown, re-
spondent has the power to control and regulate its water system 
:1nd water supply for the benefit and welfare of present and 
residents. Respondent must ascertain that the future residents 
of appellant's proposed development will have adequate and 
sufficient water and other services of all the necessary and 
customary types, and should not be compelled to grant an 
approval to a proposed Final Plat until a commitment to pro-
vide these services is made by appellant. 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE 
AFfiRMED. 
Respondent made a thorough response to appellant's 
objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
hhich was filed with the Trial Court on or about April 19, 
1979. Reference is made thereto and said response is in-
corporated herein. Respondent submits that said response 
:1dcqua tely deals with Point IV of appellant's brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court was correct in denying appellant's 
request for a \\'rit of Mandamus compelling respondent to 
approve appellant's Final Plat in light of appellant's 
failure to comply with legitimate requirements of respondent's 
ordinances and City Council and was correct in thus dis-
- 2 7 -
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111 i s s i 11 g a p p c ll an t ' s Co n1 p lain t . The Trial Court correctly 
f 0 u n J 1· c s pond c n t h ct d a p pl i cab l c an cl v a l i d cl r d 111 c111 c c s in c f f e c t 
.I u r i n ~ t he t i m c r <: l c \'a 11 t t o a p p <: l Lt n t ' s C o rn p 1 a l n t a n d t h a t 
they irrl["'sc·d obligcttions to IJc cornplied hith by appclLtnt. 
T h c T r i :tl Court ' s o 1· J e r s h o u l cl b c a f C 1 rr:: e d in 1 t s c 11 t J ret y . 
IJX!TD this 17th d:ty of September, 1979. 
OLSll:~, IIOCGM.: ~ SOR.LhSOCi 
/s/ L. Brent Hoggan 
r:-:-·1fr c n t!TC; ;: :111 
\ t tor I 1 c \' s o r R c s p o 11 d c n t 
Cl.lcTII IC\TL OF Sl 1\\ICI 
----- ------------
I her c b) c crt l r v t h Cl t I [!l a i l e cl t I ) c 0 p J e s 0 r the 
Scott !~.nrett, Barrett & \lathe,,·-;, 300 Sut:th !·-Ltln Street 
/s/ Bruce L. Jorgensen 
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